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Abstract 
While there has been much talk of the role of parliaments and courts in the Brexit process, 
far less²indeed very little²has been said about the challenges facing the largest part of 
the UK government: the administrative branch. :KDWHYHU UHVXOWV IURP WKH 8.¶V
negotiations with the EU, Brexit will likely necessitate wide-ranging and fast-paced 
administrative reform in the UK. In this article, we use a detailed case study of a particular 
part of administration²the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)²to highlight the 
nature and extent of the challenges facing administrative agencies. This case study is 
demonstrative as, while there is an extant UK competition administration structure, 
competition law and enforcement is highly Europeanised. We propose that the challenge 
facing administrative bodies in the UK²including the CMA²can be understood as 
possessing three key dimensions: internal organisation issues; external coordination issues; 
and substantive legal issues. We argue that, in many instances, these three dimensions will 
be in tension which each other. That is to say, the reality of reforming administration post-
Brexit will involve trade-offs between questions of internal organisation, external 
coordination, and substantive law.  
 
Keywords: competition administration; Brexit; state aid; merger control; UK Competition 
and Markets Authority 
 
Word count: 9,612 (text with footnotes) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the Miller case concerning the triggering of the Article 50 TEU process by which 
the UK will withdraw from the EU, there has been much talk of the role of the UK 
courts and parliaments in relation to the Brexit process and beyond.1 There has also 
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1
 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 WLR 583; R 
(Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin); [2017] 1 All 
ER 158 (concerning whether a statute was necessary for the EU to be notified under Article 50, TEU). 
For discussion of Parliament see, e.g., House of Lords European Union Committee, Scrutinising Brexit: 
the role of Parliament +/3DSHU1:ULJKWDQG23DWHOµ7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQVHTXHQFHV
RI %UH[LW :KLWHKDOO DQG :HVWPLQVWHU¶ 8&/ 2018 (21 April 2017, UCL Constitution Unit Briefing 
Paper). Discussion on the courts has related largely to the future role of the CJEU, see, e.g., R Hogarth, 
Brexit and the European Court of Justice, (2017, Institute for Government). There has also been wide-
ranging discussion of the role of the UK courts. For example, Lord Neuberger²the recently retired 
President of the UK Supreme Court²KDVSXEOLFDOO\UDLVHGWKLVLVVXHVHH&&ROHPDQµ8.MXGJHVQHHG
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been extensive discussion around the status and role of devolved institutions, 
particularly in relation to Scotland.2 Such discussion is, of course, to be welcomed. By 
comparison, however, there has been very little discussion of the challenges Brexit 
presents to the largest part of the UK government: the administrative branch.3 This 
article seeks to fill that gap by asking: what are the challenges facing UK administration 
in the wake of Brexit? This article thus offers a piece of public law futurology. It does 
this through using aspects of competition enforcement administration as a detailed case 
study. To be clear, we do not seek in this article to offer a comprehensive analysis of 
competition law and enforcement options: instead, we drill down into particular areas 
to highlight the nature of the questions that are arising in the wake of Brexit vis-à-vis 
administrative reform. Through this analysis, we propose a general framework for 
understanding the challenge Brexit poses to administrative bodies in the UK.  
This article has three main parts. Part II of the article argues that Brexit²
ZKDWHYHUIRUPWKHILQDOµDJUHHPHQW¶WDNHV, including if no agreement is reached²will 
entail administrative branch reform that is likely to be wide-ranging and fast-paced.4 
Reform is inevitable as not only legal powers but also the administrative organisational 
structures which make those powers effective will require re-calibration of some kind. 
Part III suggests that the challenge facing administrative bodies in the UK²including 
the CMA²can be understood as possessing three key dimensions: internal 
organisation issues; external coordination issues; and substantive legal issues. In many 
instances, these three dimensions will be in tension which each other. The result of this 
trade off will be an inevitably imperfect new administrative settlement.5 Part IV of the 
article offers a case study of the CMA²WKH8.¶Vprincipal competition enforcement 
agency²through the prism of the three-part framework.6 This case study has been 
selected as, while there is an extant UK competition administration structure, 
competition law and enforcement is highly Europeanised²as a result of Brexit, a 
variety of important legal and institutional questions have arisen in this sphere. Two of 
the major institutional questions facing the CMA²specifically those relating to merger 
control and state aid²are discussed, as these issues are of immediate importance 
following Brexit. While we have selected this area of administration for this study, it 
is important to note that some administrative agencies will be less affected by Brexit 
than others. It will also be the case that some bodies may be entirely unaffected (at least 
                                                     
clarity after Brexit - /RUG 1HXEHUJHU¶  $XJXVW  BBC) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
40855526> (accessed 20 October 2017). 
2
 )RU DQ H[FHOOHQW RYHUYLHZ DQG DQDO\VLV VHH 5 5DZOLQJV µ%UH[LW DQG WKH 7HUULWRULDO &RQVWLWXWLRQ
Devolution, Reregulation and Inter-JRYHUQPHQWDOUHODWLRQV¶The Constitution Society).  
3
 Our focus here is largely on central government administration. Distinct issues arise regarding, e.g., 
local government and devolved administration post-Brexit. 
4
 This is possible under Article 50. See further House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 
$UWLFOHQHJRWLDWLRQV,PSOLFDWLRQVRIµQRGHDO¶ (Ninth Report of Session 2016±17, 7 March 2017). 
5
 Of course, all administrative systems are imperfect in some way and the current system of competition 
administration is itself not perfect. 
6
 There are other agencies in the UK with powers to enforce competition law, e.g. the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), the Office of Communications (OFCOM), the Office of Water Services (OFWAT) 
and the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM). These authorities and their competition powers 
will not be considered here but they create additional complexity to the post-Brexit landscape considered 
here. 
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in some direct way). However, for the purpose of understanding and framing the 
challenges facing administration due to Brexit, it is helpful to study an organisation like 
the CMA where the effects of Brexit are more evident immediately. 
 
II. LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE UK AFTER BREXIT 
 
How the public law system is reformed in the UK has only been given detailed 
systematic study in the past few decades.7 In recent years, there has been a more 
developed discussion about the process of constitutional change in the UK (even if the 
basic proposition of practice remains unchanged: constitutional reform is simply part 
of the political process like every other law).8 What, generally speaking, remains 
neglected is systematic study how administrative systems change.9 Administrative 
FKDQJHVPD\DSSHDUDW OHDVWRQ WKHLU IDFHDVPRUHµWHFKQLFDO¶ LQQDWXUHUDWKHU WKDQ
H[SOLFLWO\ µSROLWLFDO¶ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO UHIRUPV, but administrative reforms are hugely 
significant in terms of how government actually runs day-to-day, and how individuals 
DQGXQGHUWDNLQJVLQWHUDFWZLWKWKHVWDWH,QPDQ\ZD\VLWLVWKHµPLFUR¶to constitutional 
ODZ¶VµPDFUR.¶10  
The administrative reform process in the UK is best characterised as a trade-
off, determined principally by actors within the executive branch, between quality, on 
the one hand, and efficiency, on the other hand.11 This often means, at a less abstract 
level, that administrative reform is undertaken much like any policymaking exercise, 
and with practical pressures (e.g. delays, case backlogs, cost pressures etc.) being 
highly relevant considerations in system design. It is within this broad context that 
much post-Brexit reform of administration will take place. The role for Parliament in 
relation to this reform process is, as is normally the case with administration in the UK, 
ultimately likely to be marginal in practice. 
To be clear, the post-Brexit reformation of administration and administrative 
law is inevitable.12 The relationship between EU administration and member state 
administrations is one where the EU µtends to serve as a kind of intermediary between 
                                                     
7
 R Brazier, Constitutional Reform, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. 
8
 7KHUHKDVKRZHYHUEHHQGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIIXQGDPHQWDOµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWDWXHV¶LQUHFHQW
\HDUVVHH)$KPHGDQG$3HUU\µ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO6WDWXWHV¶Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
461.  
9
 Part of this subject was addressed in A /H6XHXUµ'HVLJQLQJ5HGUHVV:KR'RHVLW+RZDQG:K\"¶
(2012) 20(1) Asia Pacific Law Review 17; A Le Sueur and V Bondy, Designing redress: a study about 
grievances against public bodies 1XIILHOG)RXQGDWLRQ5HSRUW7KHUHDUHKHOSIXOJHQHUDOµPDFUR¶
accounts of administrative change but these rarely dig into the details of the change process e.g. P Cane, 
Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
10
 7*LQVEXUJµ:ULWWHQ&RQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKH$GPLQLstrative State: On the Constitutional Character of 
$GPLQLVWUDWLYH /DZ¶ LQ 6 5RVH-Ackerman and P Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2010). 
11
 Le Sueur and Bondy see note 9 above, pp.22-32 (considering the various actors responsible for 
designing redress concerning administration in the UK). 
12
 Our definition of administrative law is broad, to include all aspects of the relationship between law 
and administration, and not simply the principles of judicial review. 
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different national administrations.¶13 This has been conceptualised as the EU being a 
µsecond order administration¶14 to member state administrations, or EU administration 
being µan administration composed of other administrations and interacting with them 
in a series of ways.¶15 This µcomposite administration¶ emerges directly from µthe very 
nature of supranational governance allied with the networked character of relations 
between various regional, national and supranational levels of administration in the 
EU.¶16 EU administration, mixed as it is with member state administrations, has also 
become more and more intertwined to international levels of governance.17 The task 
for UK administration after Brexit is then, as one former Director General of the WTO 
SXWLWHTXLYDOHQWWR³UHPRYLQJHJJIURPDQRPHOHWWH´18 Of course, much of the detail 
of the extent of the change required is dependent on what is agreed between the UK 
and the EU, both during and beyond the Article 50 process. Whatever the eventual 
position is, it is clear that, barring some wholly unexpected political turnaround, full 
UK membership of the EU is off the negotiating table19²LIµ%UH[LW¶LVWRPHDQDQ\WKLQJ
at all, at the very least it has to mean this.20 But the UK¶VSRVLWLRQVHHPVWREHDWOHDVW
at present, to try to seek more regulatory freedom from the EU via an extensive free 
trade agreement rather than an association agreement.21 Such a move would have the 
consequence of UK administration taking significant responsibility back from the EU. 
Whatever the details are, Brexit makes administrative reform effectively inevitable 
irrespective of the outcome of the negotiating process. The major reason for this is that 
there are many powers and functions, presently held and carried out by EU agencies, 
which the UK will likely have to assume responsibility for at the national level. The 
UK could, for instance, assume exclusive power in those areas it has shared competence 
with the EU, such as social policy, environmental policy, consumer protection, 
chemicals regulation, medicine evaluation, and energy.22 Our study of competition 
                                                     
13
 D Curtin, µ([HFXWLYH3RZHU¶LQ'3DWWHUVRQDQG$ Södersten (eds.), A Companion to European Law 
and International Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 2016); B Bastos, Beyond Executive Federalism: The Judicial 
Crafting of the Law of Composite Administrative Decision-Making (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, European 
University Institute, 2018). 
14
 Bastos, above n 13. 
15
 '&XUWLQµ6HFRQGRUGHUVHFUHF\DQG(XURSH¶VOHJDOLW\PRVDLFV¶West European Politics 
(online pre-publication), 4. 
16
 Ibid, 4. 
17
 A von Bogdandy and P Dann, µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPSRVLWH$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ&RQFHSWXDOL]LQJ0XOWL-Level 
and Network Aspects in the Exercise of ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3XEOLF $XWKRULW\¶  9(11) German Law 
Journal 2013. 
18
 B Chu, µBrexit will be like 'removing egg from an omelette', warns former World Trade Organisation 
chief¶7KH,QGHSHQGHQW 27 February 2018). 
19
 HM Government, 7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VH[LW IURPDQGQHZSDUWQHUVKLSZLWK WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ 
(Cm 9417, 2017).  
20
 The new post-referendum Prime Minister (Theresa May MP), then campaigning for the post of 
&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\ OHDGHU IDPRXVO\UHPDUNHG WKDW µ%UH[LWPHDQV%UH[LW¶VHH$&RZEXUQ µ7KHUHVD
May says 'Brexit means Brexit' and there will be no attempt to remaLQLQVLGH(8¶7KH,QGHSHQGHQW
July 2016). 
21
 Theresa May, Florence Speech (September 22 2017).  
22
 See Article 4 of the TFEU. Article 4(1) states that the EU shares competence with the Member States, 
where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not fall within the category of exclusive 
competence (Article 3 TFEU) or the category of competencHµWRFDUU\RXWDFWLRQVWRVXSSRUWFRRUGLQDWH
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administration effectively highlights the much wider FKDOOHQJHVRI³UHPRYLQJHJJIURP
DQRPHOHWWH´ across all areas of administration. 
The assumption of additional administrative responsibilities on the national 
level will involve a complex and extensive re-organisation of legal powers (itself 
presenting a significant problem of constitutional law in relation to the appropriate use 
of delegated powers to create secondary legislation, which is widely expected to be 
how this transition will be facilitated).23 But beyond the technicalities of rearranging 
various powers, there will have to be some²potentially very large²changes in an 
organisational sense. When viewed from this perspective, Brexit has never presented 
merely a matter of shifting around the legal powers granted to various administrative 
agencies. Instead, it will involve the creation of new teams within administrative 
agencies (as well as, perhaps, new agencies), the re-distribution of budgets, and many 
other significant functional changes. 
Post-Brexit administrative reform, as well as being inevitable, is likely to be 
fast-paced and wide-ranging. It is likely to be wide-ranging for similar reasons given 
for its virtual inevitability: there will be many legal and functional gaps to plug within 
administration. Reform is likely to be fast-paced due, principally, to how Article 50 
works. As is now well-known, after µnotification¶ there is a two-year window within 
which the exiting Member State and the EU are able to make an agreement.24 Given 
the extent of what has to be negotiated, this is a very short amount of time. A 
transitional framework may ease the pressure here.25 Nonetheless, such restrictive 
timeframes²especially when seen in the light of WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSURPLVH WRgive 
µ3DUOLDPHQW WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ WR GHEDWH DQG scrutinise WKH FKDQJHV¶²promises high-
tempo administrative reform.26 In the absence of quick changes, so-FDOOHG µ%UH[LW
GD\¶²whenever it arrives²presents not just an international trade µcliff-edge¶ but also 
a domestic administrative one. 
 
                                                     
RU VXSSOHPHQW WKHDFWLRQVRI WKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶)XUWKHUPRUH$UWLFOH7)(8SURYLGHVD OLVWRI
µSULQFLSDO¶FDWHJRULHVRIVKDUHGDFWLRQV7KHUHIRUHWKHOLVWVKRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGH[KDXVWLYHDVWKH
cateJRU\RIVKDUHGFRPSHWHQFHLVDµJHQHUDOUHVLGXDOFDWHJRU\¶VHH3&UDLJDQG*GH%~UFDEU Law: 
Text, Cases, and Materials, 6th ed (Oxford University Press, 2015), p.83.   
23
 In its February 2017 White Paper (HM Government, 7KH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V H[LW IURP and new 
partnership with the European Union (Cm 9417, 2017), p.10), the Government stated one of the 
SURSRVHG *UHDW 5HSHDO $FW¶V µWKUHH SULPDU\ HOHPHQWV¶ ZLOO EH WR µHQDEOH FKDQJHV WR EH PDGH E\
secondary legislation to the laws that would otherwise not function sensibly once we have left the EU, 
VRWKDWRXUOHJDOV\VWHPFRQWLQXHVWRIXQFWLRQFRUUHFWO\RXWVLGHWKH(8¶6HHIXUWKHU J Simson Caird, 
House of Commons Library Briefing Note: Legislating for Brexit: the Great Repeal Bill (Number 7793, 
23 February 2017), section 5; House of Lords Constitution Committee, 7KH µ*UHDW5HSHDO%LOO¶DQG
Delegated Powers (HL Paper 123, 7 March 2017). 
24
 $UWLFOHLQSDUWSURYLGHVµ>W@KH7UHDWLHVVKDOOFHDVHWRDSSO\WRWKH6WDWHLQTXHVWLRQIURPWKHGDWH
of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred 
to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, 
XQDQLPRXVO\GHFLGHVWRH[WHQGWKLVSHULRG¶ 
25
 K Armstrong, J Bell, P Daly, and M Elliott, Implementing Transition: How Would it Work? 
(Cambridge Centre for European Legal Studies and Centre for Public Law, 2017). 
26
 7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VH[LW IURPDQGQHZSDUWQHUVKLSZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ see note 19 above 
[1.8]. 
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III. FRAMING THE CHALLENGE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AFTER 
BREXIT 
 
It is helpful to devise a more precise general framework for understanding the 
challenges facing administrative bodies in the UK after Brexit. As said, we suggest 
there are three key dimensions to that challenge. The first type of challenge facing 
administrative bodies after Brexit relates to internal organisation. By this it is meant 
questions of how administrative bodies structure their own procedures, resources, staff 
etc.27 The second type of challenge for administrative agencies relates to external 
coordination. External coordination challenges are those concerning how the 
administrative body works with other bodies, both at the EU and UK levels. The third 
type of challenge are substantive legal issues. Much of administrative reform takes 
SODFH XQGHU WKH UXEULF RI µRSHUDWLRQDO FKDQJH¶ 7KDW LV WR VD\ LW GRHV QRW LQYROYH
reforming legislation or other laws but, instead, amending how something is done in 
SUDFWLFH 2FFDVLRQDOO\ KRZHYHU µKDUG¶ OHJDO QRUPV GR VWUXFWXUH UHVSRQVHV WR
administrative reform. One response is to work around the legal norm. Another is to 
seek to change it (for example, by pressing for legislative reform).  
Among the three categories outlined above, there will²in many instances at 
least²be tensions. The tensions exist at two levels: within the categories and between 
the categories. In respect of the former, the idea that designing (or reforming) 
administrative bodies is a task riddled with unresolvable tensions was observed by 
Teubner.28 He argued that almost all legal and political institutions are placed under the 
competing demands of efficacy, responsiveness, and coherence. That is to say, citizens 
and others demand administrative bodies to be successful in managing their role, to be 
responsive to the public will, and to be aligned with the foundational normative 
commitments of society. Teubner contended that any design or re-design of an 
administrative institution that sought to improve its performance in one of these three 
respects would almost certainly have negative effects on at least one of the other two. 
As Mashaw put it, this can be read as painting a picture of the task of µstructuring and 
FRQWUROOLQJ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ DV D µSHUSHWXDOO\ XQVDWLVIDFWRU\ SURMHFW RI
institutional design,¶ZKLFKHYHQKDVµDFHUWDLQIDWDOLVWLFKXH¶29 ,QRWKHUZRUGVµIURP
RQHRUDQRWKHUSHUVSHFWLYHHYHU\LQVWLWXWLRQZLOOIDLORUEHVHHQDVSDUWLDOO\IDLOLQJ¶30 
This nature of administrative institutions, of course, transcends issues created by 
Brexit. Administration existed in these conditions before Brexit. At the same time, the 
scale and speed of the administrative reforms that Brexit will likely prompt is an 
exceptional instance where many of these tensions that already exist within 
                                                     
27
 B Forbes DQG0+XJKHVµ%UH[LWDQG,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU8.0HUJHU&RQWURO,PSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH&0$¶V
ZRUNORDGDQGZKDWQRWWRGR¶Competition Bulletin)HEUXDU\-9LFNHUVµ&RQVHTXHQFHVRI
%UH[LWIRUFRPSHWLWLRQODZDQGSROLF\¶VXSSOxford Review of Economic Policy 70. 
28
 *7HXEQHUµ-XULGLILFDWLRQ&RQFHSWV$VSHFWV/LPLWV6ROXWLRQV¶LQ*7HXEQHUHGJuridification of 
Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust, and Social Welfare 
Law (Walter de Gruyter, 1987). 
29
 -/0DVKDZµ6WUXFWXULQJD'HQVH&RPSOH[LW\$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQGWKH3URMHFWRI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZ¶
(2005) 5(1) Issues in Legal Scholarship 1, p.14. 
30
 Ibid. 
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administrative bodies will be thrust forward and debated. Similarly, there are regularly 
tensions about external co-ordination and substantive law in administrative bodies. 
These two issues will likely often be dragged into focus by Brexit. Furthermore, we 
will also see tensions not just within issues of internal organisation, co-ordination, and 
substantive law, Brexit will also raise tensions between these areas. For instance, the 
preferred internal organisation of an administrative body may be compromised by the 
preferred external coordination strategy, such as maintaining a close working 
relationship with EU administration. Again, these types of tension are not new, but 
Brexit highlights and unsettles them. Ultimately, these tensions²both within and 
between each of the categories outlined²will get resolved at some point, even if only 
by the absence of action. They may be determined by administrative bodies themselves, 
of by external forces beyond their individual control. The result, in the many different 
LQVWDQFHVZKHUHVXFKWHQVLRQVZLOODULVHZLOOEHWKHFUHDWLRQRIWKH8.¶VQHZSRVW-
Brexit administrative settlement. This tripartite framework can serve as an analytical 
tool to highlight both the nature of those tensions and assist in mapping them out.  
 
IV. A CASE STUDY OF THE COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY 
 
A powerful example of the inevitability of administrative reform post-Brexit can be 
seen in the context of competition law enforcement. In this part of this article, we use 
the CMA as a case study by which to examine in detail the difficulties facing the UK 
administration following Brexit in terms of internal organisation, external coordination 
and substantial law as described above. We do not seek to explore the whole of the 
challenges facing administrative reform in the competition enforcement, instead we 
look closely at two particular areas: merger controls and state aid. These areas are of 
particular interest post-Brexit as the CMA will gain competence in those areas ± 
competence which currently belongs to the European Commission µ&RPPLVVLRQ¶ ±   
and it will significantly increase the workload for the CMA.31 Currently, the 
Commission  has exclusive competence to (i) clear mergers with a community 
dimension based on the thresholds set out in the European Merger Regulation 
µ(805¶ and (ii) decide whether state aid by a Member State is deemed compatible 
with Article 107 TFEU. While there is an extant UK competition administration 
structure, competition law and enforcement is highly Europeanised and, as a result of 
Brexit, a variety of important legal and institutional questions are now in play. 
Furthermore, competition law²though it is often far from the headlines and from 
mainstream consciousness²is as an important tool for ensuring consumer welfare and 
a significant driver in the UK economy. The CMA estimated that it produced an annual 
average of direct consumer benefits of £745 million between 2012-2013 and 2014-
2015.32 The pending UK departure from the EU raises the concern that any weakening 
                                                     
31
 In its written evidence (CMP0002) to House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: competition 
and State aid (HL 67, 2018), the CMA has estimated that Brexit could result in an additional caseload 
of 30 to 50 phase 1 mergers and half a dozen phase 2 cases each year.   
32
 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General: The UK competition regime 
(2016), p.4. 
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of the competition law regime would ultimately have a negative impact on consumers 
and the wider economy. Even if substantive laws are kept for the most part, 
administration will remain a key issue as the success of competition rules is contingent 
upon effective enforcement.33 This was recognised recently through the passing of the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the 8.¶V implementation of the Damages Directive on 
9 March 2017, which make it easier to bring private enforcement actions in the 
domestic courts.34 Through looking at some of the challenges facing the CMA in the 
context of mergers and state aid, we highlight how the reality of reforming 
administration post-Brexit will involve trade-offs within and between questions of 
internal organisation, external coordination, and substantive law.  
Before looking in detail at mergers and state aid, it is important to explain the 
wider institutional framework of competition law enforcement in the UK and the 
questions that Brexit is posing of it. In terms of substantive law, the two main 
components of UK competition law are the Competition Act 1998 (CA98), on antitrust, 
and the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02), on mergers and markets. The central enforcement 
body is the CMA, but there are a range of other authorities with competition powers.35 
Because the main components of UK competition law are UK statutes, they will remain 
in situ after Brexit. It is worth noting that the anticompetitive conducts covered by 
articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, will still be deemed illegal under UK law, as Chapter 
I and Chapter II of the CA98 replicate in almost identical terms.36 Thus it may not be 
necessary to implement wide-ranging substantive changes to competition law rules 
currently in force in the UK. There are, however, some exceptions. For example, there 
may need to be a clarification in regard to the territorial scope of Chapter I.37 Moreover, 
the UK has no state aid legal framework and will need to enact rules on state aid. The 
UK has not enforced State aid since it gained accession to the EU in 1973. Department 
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy µ%(,6¶ has merely been able to help 
public authorities understand state aid issues and advise on how to reduce and manage 
risk of providing state aid, but not enforce against illegal state aid against a national 
legal framework. 
In relation to the role of the EU courts, it may be necessary to amend or repeal 
Section 60 CA98, as they will no longer have jurisdiction over the UK.38 Section 60 of 
                                                     
33
 P Lowe, M Marquis, and G Monti (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2013: Effective and 
Legitimate Enforcement of Competition Law (Hart, 2016). 
34
 The Claims in respect of Loss or Damage arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 
1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 2017 (implementing Directive 2014/104/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing action for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union). On the benefits, see Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (now 
BEIS), UK implementation of the EU Damages Directive (2014/104/EU): Impact assessment (2015). 
35
 This body was created on 1 April 2014 by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, and took 
over the competition functions of the Office of Fair Trading and Competition Commission. 
36
 A working group²the Brexit Competition Law Working Group²chaired by Sir John Vickers has been 
established to consider these issues, see: Brexit Competition Law Working Group, Conclusion and 
Recommendations (2017) [1.7]. 
37
 Ibid [2.3] 
38
 0&ROHPDQµ7KHIXWXUHRIVHFWLRQ&$SRVW-Brexit: Observation on the provisional Conclusions 
RI WKH %UH[LW &RPSHWLWLRQ /DZ :RUNLQJ *URXS¶ Brexit Competition Law Working Group, 2017) 
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the CA98 requires UK courts, tribunals and competition authorities to ensure 
consistency with EU law and, in particular, any principles applied and decision research 
by EU Courts. The consistency principle in section 60 CA98 will not remain a 
requirement post-Brexit. However, some argue it would be a good idea for UK courts 
and regulatory bodies to µKDYH UHJDUG WR¶ UHOHYDQW (8 &RXUW -XGJPHQWV DQG (&
decisions39 in order to provide legal certainty to UK business. This approach posits 
VHYHUDOLVVXHVUHODWHGWRKRZWKHH[SUHVVLRQµKDYHUHJDUGWR¶VKRXOGEH interpreted.40 
According to Coleman, µKDYHUHJDUGWR¶ZRXOGHQWDLOWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKH(8FDVHV
and in order to depart from them, it would be necessary to provide clear reason for 
GRLQJ VR7KXV VXFKSURSRVHGDPHQGPHQWZRXOG VWLOO µDSSHDU WR JLYH FRQVLderable 
weight to EU law in the decision-PDNLQJSUDFWLFHVRIWKH&0$DQGWKH8.FRXUWV¶41 
The amendment or repeal of section 60 CA98 raises the policy question on how much 
influence do we still want to confer to EU law over competition law in the UK and it 
may be an opportunity for the UK not to have regard to it. The single market imperative 
underpinning the entire ethos of the EU made it necessary to implement the consistency 
principle in section 60 CA98, but leaving the EU and the single market (if this is the 
end result of the Brexit negotiations) will arguably make this principle redundant for 
the UK. Nevertheless, this view collides with the one of the BCLWG, which believes 
it could threat legal certainty.42 Arguably, this fear is short-lived given that EU law is 
so imbedded in UK case law so even if we disregard EU jurisprudence, the UK 
competition law system will retain the desired legal certainty. In a recent report by the 
+RXVHRI/RUGVRQµ%UH[LWFRPSHWLWLRQDQG6WDWHDLG¶LWZDVKLJKOLJKWHGWKDWthe UK 
may wish, over time, to depart from EU competition case law, particularly as the Single 
Market imperative underpinning it may no longer be relevant to the UK. With the 
repatriation of responsibility in this area, the UK will be free to take a more innovative 
and responsive approach to tackling global competition enforcement challenges.43  
Beyond substantive legal issues, without administrative reform there could be 
serious holes in the enforcement of competition rules in the UK sphere.44 For example, 
Sir Philip Lowe, a former Director General of Competition, has predicted that a 
significant number of mergers, cartels, and cases linked to abuse of market power by 
large firms²previously dealt with by the Commission due to their international 
aspects²will be added to the &0$¶V workload.45 The inevitable result of this, Lowe 
has claimed, will have a substantial impact on the internal organisation: 
 
The substantially increased responsibilities of the CMA and related UK institutions post-Brexit, 
will require a correspondingly substantial increase in its staff resources. It is unrealistic to 
                                                     
available at <https://www.bclwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Martin-Coleman-Section-60-
Note.pdf> [Accessed 23 February 2018]. 
39
 Brexit Competition Law Working Group, see note 36 above [2.8]. 
40
 Coleman, see note 34 above. 
41
 Ibid.  
42
 Brexit Competition Law Working Group, see note 36 above [2.8] 
43
 House of Lords European Union Committee, see note 27 above. 
44
 Ibid [1.5]. 
45
 3 /RZH µ7KH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI %UH[LW IRU 8. DQG (8 FRPSHWLWLRQ SROLF\ DQG ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW¶
(Response to Brexit Competition Law Working Group Issues Paper, 2016), p.11. 
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LPDJLQHWKDWWKHLQFUHDVHGZRUNORDGFDQEHGHDOWZLWKVLJQLILFDQWO\E\DFKDQJHLQWKH&0$¶V
enforcement priorities. With unchanged staff numbers, its future involvement in international 
mergers, cartels and antitrust cases could well eliminate any possibility for it to engage in 
market enquiries and consumer protection work.46 
 
To put this in more general terms: the main administrative organ charged with the task 
of competition enforcement in the UK will be compelled to revisit their powers and 
how they, in organizational terms, manage to carry out their functions. The issues 
presented by Brexit to competition law and enforcement are manifold and complex. 
For the sake of the present case study we will drill down into two of the major 
challenges facing competition administration in the UK post-Brexit in terms of internal 
organisation and external coordination: merger control and state aid.  
 
A. Merger control 
 
At present, UK mergers that meet certain turnover thresholds fall exclusively under the 
jurisdiction of the EUMR.47 +RZHYHU%UH[LW LV OLNHO\WRHQGWKLVµRQH-VWRS¶PHUJHU
control regime for UK companies, leading to more mergers being reviewed by the 
CMA under the Enterprise Act 2002, creating internal organisational pressures. In 
certain cases, this will result in parallel investigations between the CMA and the 
Commission²creating a clear issue of external coordination. A transaction that 
qualifies under the EUMR may also be subject to UK merger control. Mergers, whether 
of UK or foreign businesses that meet both UK and EU thresholds will likely face 
scrutiny under both systems. Furthermore, the CMA will not be able to seek a reference 
on the back of a UK national dimension of an EU merger. In some cases a Member 
State may request a transaction, which would otherwise be reviewed by the 
Commission, to be considered at the Member State level. For these cases the EUMR 
provides for a referral mechanism for the Member State.48 Giving Member State 
authorities and merging parties the ability to reallocate jurisdiction helps to ensure that 
merger transactions are reviewed by the best placed authority in the EU to conduct the 
review.  The referral mechanisms will continue to apply in the run-up to Brexit. For 
mergers that have been notified to the Commission by the time of Brexit, the CMA 
should make fullest use possible of its ability to request full or partial reference back to 
the UK of any notified merger that is likely to have a significant nexus to or impact on 
the UK. For mergers that have been notified to the Commission for which the 
geographic market(s) is EEA-wide or global, and/or the relevant assets that might be 
subject to a remedy are outside the UK, the referral requirements may not allow the 
Commission to refer the transaction back to the UK for review. For mergers that have 
not yet been notified at the point of Brexit, it would be sensible for the parties to 
mergers with a significant UK component to engage in pre-notification contacts with 
                                                     
46
 Ibid, p.12. 
47
 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 (OJ 2004 L24/1, 29.1.2004). See further N Parr, R Finbow, and M 
Hughes (eds), UK Merger Control: Law and Practice, 3rd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016). 
48
 The European Merger Regulation 139/2004 Article 9(2) provides that a member state may request 
referral on its own initiative or upon the invitation of the Commission. 
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both the Commission and the CMA. While the CMA could apply its own merger 
control rules in such a case, it will do so in parallel with the Commission, rather than 
in its stead. Such parallel review raises the possibility of one authority permitting a 
merger and the other blocking one, or of diverging remedies between the UK and EU 
regimes.49 All mergers requiring multi-jurisdictional consent face the challenges of 
coordination and conflicting outcomes, but Brexit will generate additional transaction 
risks if the merger requires clearance in both the UK and the EU. It has been suggested 
LQWKH+RXVHRI/RUGV¶UHSRUWRQµ%UH[LWFRPSHWLWLRQDQG6WDWHDLG¶WKDWit would be 
helpful for the CMA to issue guidance on this referral mechanism as the Brexit process 
develops. This would allow merging parties to understand the external coordination 
between the CMA and the Commission. This is to provide greater certainty to 
businesses as to the considerations that the CMA may take into account and the 
type/extent of engagement that it may have with parties in order to make the necessary 
determinations. Moreover, the risk of double jeopardy for firms operating in both the 
UK and the EU is strong reason for the CMA to consider some form of coordination 
relationship with EU enforcement. Here, we may see issues of external coordination 
have to take priority over internal organisation preferences. 
To put these changes in the context of impact they may have on the &0$¶V 
internal organisation, the CMA published 60 decisions concerning qualifying mergers 
in 2015/16 and 56 such decisions in 2016/17.50 In 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively, 
the EU Commission was notified of 337, 362 and 380 mergers it ought to consider.51 
Even 20 or 30 more merger decisions dealt with at the UK-level would represent a very 
substantial increase in the &0$¶V workload.52 To manage its workload, the CMA has 
discretion not to refer a merger case if the market concerned is of insufficient 
importance to merit a µ3KDVH ,,¶ investigation, also known as the de minimis 
exception.53 This applies where: (1) the annual value in the UK of the market or markets 
concerned is, in aggregate, less than £3 million, provided there is no clear cut 
undertaking instead of a Phase II reference available; (2) the annual value in the UK in 
aggregate is between £3 million and £10 million and the expected consumer harm 
resulting from the merger is not materially greater than the average public cost of a 
Phase II investigation (which is around £400,000) having regard to the size of the 
market concerned, the likelihood of an substantial lessening of competition µSLC¶, 
                                                     
49
 Conflicting outcomes between the UK and other European competition authorities have recently 
occurred in relation to $N]R¶V proposed acquisition of Metlac (which was cleared in several jurisdictions 
around the world but blocked in the UK) and (XURWXQQHO¶V attempt to purchase the former SeaFrance 
business (which was cleared in France but blocked in the UK). Another, older example of conflicting 
outcomes occurred in relation to *(¶V bid for Honeywell (which was cleared in the USA but blocked in 
the EU).  
50https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69
7957/Merger-inquiry-outcomes-March-2018.pdf [Accessed 30 April 2018]. 
51
 European Commission, Merger Statistics (2017) available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2018]. 
52
 %)RUEHVDQG0+XJKHVµ%UH[LWDQG,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU8.0HUJHU&RQWURO,PSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH&0$¶V
ZRUNORDGDQGZKDWQRWWRGR¶Competition Bulletin)HEUXDU\-9LFNHUVµ&RQVHTXHQFHVRI
%UH[LWIRUFRPSHWLWLRQODZDQGSROLF\¶VXSS Oxford Review of Economic Policy 70. 
53
  Section 22(2)(a) and section 33(2)(a), Enterprise Act 2002. 
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the magnitude of any competition that would be lost, and the duration of any SLC; or 
(3) any relevant consumer benefits outweigh the SLC and its adverse effects.54 
According to the 2010 Guidance on such exceptions, where the annual value of the 
market concerned is in aggregate more than £10 million, the CMA will generally 
consider the case to be of sufficient importance to justify a reference.55 Where the 
annual value of the market concerned is in aggregate less than £3 million, the CMA 
will generally consider that a reference is not justified. Where the annual value of the 
market is between £3 million and £10 million, the CMA will have regard to the factors 
mentioned in (2) above.   
The CMA has recently changed the upper bound threshold over which the CMA 
considers that the market(s) concerned will generally be of sufficient importance to 
justify a reference from £10 million to £15 million.56 Furthermore, the CMA has altered 
the lower bound threshold (i.e. the threshold which the CMA will generally not 
consider a reference justified) from £3 million to £5 million.57  The decision of whether 
a case falls within the de minimis exception is not linked to the SDUWLHV¶ cost of the 
proceedings but cost to the public purse. Thus, a case may be referred even if a referral 
negates the anticipated synergies of the case. From 2007 to January 2017, in 21% of 
Phase II cases, the parties chose to abandon the deal rather than proceed with the Phase 
II referral.58 It has been recognised that the fact that the CMA can review mergers due 
to concerns in markets that are entirely insignificant is a common source of frustration 
for merging parties. Any opportunity to extend the scope of the de minimis exception 
may thus be welcome.  
A potential revenue-raising exercise for the CMA in light of the increased 
workload due to Brexit involves merger filing fees. Such a fee is expected not to be 
very welcome, especially for smaller mergers. As it stands, the UK utilises a voluntary 
filing system, meaning that businesses are not required to notify their mergers to the 
CMA. This means that even if a merger triggers either the turnover threshold or the 
share of supply threshold,59 the merging parties can choose not to notify the merger to 
the CMA but rather to go ahead and complete the transaction. With Brexit comes the 
question of whether the CMA should implement a mandatory merger notification 
system. However, this does need to be balanced against the concerns of businesses. The 
flexibility of the voluntary system with a clawback right (meaning that the CMA can 
                                                     
54
 Office of Fair Trading, Mergers: Exceptions to the duty to refer and undertakings in lieu of reference 
guidance (OFT1122, 2010). 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Competition and Markets Authority, Mergers: Exception to the duty to refer in markets of insufficient 
importance (CMA64 June 2017) 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 J Schmidt, µ%LJ Enough to Matter or Too Small to Care? Small Mergers and Competition $XWKRULWLHV¶ 
(Shepherd and Wedderburn, 2017) available at <https://shepwedd.com/sites/default/files/Big_enough% 
20_to_matter_or_too_small_to_care.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2018]. 
59
 Transactions are caught by the UK merger control rules (under the Enterprise Act 2002) and may be 
investLJDWHGE\WKH&0$LIWKHUHDUHDµUHOHYDQWPHUJHUVLWXDWLRQ¶$PHUJHUVLWXDWLRQZLOOTXDOLI\IRU
review if it meets either of the two alternative jurisdictional tests: 1) If the enterprise to be acquired 
exceeds £70 million turnover (the turnover test) or 2) as a result of the merger, 25% share of supply of 
JRRGVRUVHUYLFHVRIDQ\GHVFULSWLRQLVFUHDWHGRUHQKDQFHGLQWKH8.DVDZKROHRULQVRPH³VXEVWDQWLDO
SDUW´RIWKH8.VKDUHRIVXSSO\WHVW 
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still intervene in those mergers which may already be underway but were not notified 
to the CMA) means that there is still protection against anticompetitive activity, but 
without the burden on businesses by forcing them to notify. However, the downside to 
the voluntary regime is that it may cause costs and damage to businesses when it 
intervenes post-merger. It may be worth considering alternatives to increasing the de 
minimis thresholds and merger filing fees as a means of generating funds for the CMA. 
One of the other options would be increasing notification thresholds in order to reduce 
the number of smaller mergers that are notifiable to the CMA. The CMA could also 
take a prioritisation decision that it will investigate fewer smaller or simpler mergers.60 
Alternatively, the CMA could simply not conduct investigations with the intensity that 
it currently does.61 The review process could be altered for simpler cases, for example 
by: changing the µGXW\ to UHIHU¶ to a µGLVFUHWLRQ to refer¶ mergers to Phase II. Even 
where competition is significantly lessened the CMA ought to be able to decide whether 
or not to clear the merger in Phase I if the parties to the transaction agree on an 
appropriate remedy; reducing the time available at Phase I and Phase II investigations 
(including placing limits on pre-notification discussions); revisiting the powers and 
duties of the Panel at Phase II so that they focus solely on remedies or on issues that 
remain in dispute at the end of Phase I. Beyond this, the CMA could look at its internal 
resourcing, such as reallocating staff from other areas (such as market investigations or 
antitrust) to merger cases. In the longer term, if resourcing is a pressing issue, 
Parliament could legislate to raise the jurisdictional thresholds and/or give the CMA 
more flexibility to accept remedies in Phase I, especially considering that the 
Commission is strikingly more flexible in accepting remedies at this stage. One final 
potential remedy for a CMA lacking in resources could be, where the CMA considers 
cases which are also reviewed by the Commission, in particular where the UK issues 
are not materially different from those raised in the Member States, for the CMA to 
clear cases on the basis of UK versions of the remedies agreed by the Commission in 
Phase I or Phase II. With these types of cases, the CMA could focus its analysis and its 
resources on whether the UK raises any materially different issues from those arising 
in the EU Member States and whether there are any plain flaws in the CommissiRQ¶V 
market analysis or the remedies package. Ultimately, by utilising more efficient and 
prudential methods in analysing merger cases, the CMA may conserve funds without 
the need for recourse to altering the de minimis thresholds or increase the merger filing 
fees. 
Another significant legal impact of Brexit in the context of merger control will 
be the extension of the reach of public interest provisions. Currently the government 
can only override competition concerns with public interest issues such as national 
security,62 media plurality and the stability of the financial system in relation to mergers 
                                                     
60
 Brexit Competition Law Working Group, µ%UH[LW Competition Law Working Group: Second 
5RXQGWDEOH¶ (Brexit Competition Law Working Group, 2016), pp.2-3. 
61
 A Lindsay, µ%UH[LW Competition Law Working Group Issues Paper 5HVSRQVH¶ (Brexit Competition 
Law Working Group, 2016), p.2.  
62
 In October 2017, the UK government, through the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy launched the National Security and Infrastructure Investment Review, where it is proposed to 
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being reviewed under UK merger control law. After Brexit, the UK might be able to 
permit a merger considered to be in the public interest to proceed in the UK 
notwithstanding that it had been prohibited at EU level, provided that the prohibited 
EU aspects of the transaction could be carved out of the wider transaction. This 
possibility is part of the broader question of the extent to which non-competition 
considerations should apply in UK merger policy. Vickers claims, however, that the 
OXUHRIWKHµSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶VKRXOGEHUHVLVWHGZKHQLWFRPHVWRFRPSHWLWLRQSROLF\63 
The Brexit Competition Law Working Group is of the same view: even if Brexit would 
allow the government to introduce other non-competition grounds to the merger control 
system, such approach should not be taken.64 The inclusion of other non-competition 
FULWHULD PLJKW HQWDLO µGLVWRUWLQJ PHUJHU SROLF\ DZD\ IURP its prime focus on 
competition.¶65 Even if public interest is present in many jurisdictions, it is narrowly 
interpreted66 DQG µKDV EHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ PDUJLQDOLVHG¶67 Public interest can be 
incorporated in the domestic legislation in several ways, and the one usually preferred 
is as an exception to the substantive test.68 The latter test being reasonable belief, on 
the basis of the evidence available, that the proposed acquisition may operate or be 
expected to operate against the public interest i.e. whether on the balance of 
probabilities it will do so.69 Investment in the UK could be at risk due to the 
unpredictability that such non-competition criteria might create.70 Additionally, there 
is a global plea for convergence in merger regulations arising out from the International 
Competition Network, the OECD and UNCTAD.71A further expansion of public 
interest, due to the consideration of socio-economic factors, would undermine the 
benefits that convergence bring to the merger review system.72 However, if the contrary 
is decided, and new non-competition grounds are introduced, it has been argued that 
WKH\ VKRXOG KDYH D QDUURZ VFRSH DQG EH µDSSOLHG LQ D GLVFLSOLQHG WUDQVSDUHQt and 
REMHFWLYHPDQQHU¶73  
Overall, visible in the mergers context post-Brexit is a complex set of tensions, 
particularly between questions of how the CMA internally organises itself, due to the 
lack of endless resources at a time where the CMA is gaining competence to review 
mergers that may otherwise had been looked at by the Commission, to what extent it 
                                                     
allow the government to intervene in the merger of small businesses when there are national security 
FRQFHUQVVHH'HSDUWPHQW IRU%XVLQHVV(QHUJ\	,QGXVWULDO6WUDWHJ\ µ*RYHUQPHQWXSGDWHVPHUJHUV
UHJLPH WR SURWHFW QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\¶  2FWREHU  DYDLODEOH DW
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-updates-mergers-regime-to-protect-national-
security> [Accessed 23 February 2018].  
63
 Vickers see note 52 above. 
64
 Brexit Competition Law Working Group, see note 36 above [3.9] 
65
 Ibid [3.12] 
66
 '5HDGHUµ$FFRPPRGDWLQJ3XEOLF,QWHUHVW&RQVLGHUDWLRQVLQ'RPHVWLF0HUJHU&RQWURO(PSLULFDO
,QVLJKWV¶UEA Law School Centre for Competition Policy, 2016), p.58. 
67
 Ibid p.1. 
68
 Reader see note 66 above. 
69
 Office of Fair Trading & Ors v IBA Health Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 142 (19 February 2004). 
70
 Reader see note 66 above. 
71
 Ibid p 25 
72
 Reader see note 66 above at p.25 
73
 Brexit Competition Law Working Group, see note 36 above at [3.14]. 
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will need to externally coordinate with the Commission in terms of case allocation and 
divergence in the transitional period and beyond.  
 
 
B. State aid 
 
State aid is likely to raise the most urgent problem following Brexit for several reasons. 
Firstly, the EU is likely to insist on state aid control as a condition for any 
comprehensive trading agreement, as confirmed in the European Council guidelines 
for Brexit negotiations.74 $FFRUGLQJ WR WKHVH JXLGHOLQHV D WUDGLQJ DJUHHPHQW µPXVW
HQVXUH D OHYHO SOD\LQJ ILHOG LQ WHUPV RI FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG VWDWH DLG¶75 as well as 
µDSSURSULDWHHQIRUFHPHQWDQGGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWPHFKDQLVPV¶76 Thus, according to the 
guidelines, it is not enough to merely include state aid as a principle, there must be 
appropriate enforcement of state aid in the UK. Secondly, there are no state aid statutes 
in the UK which mirror Article 107 TFEU, presenting a clear and unavoidable issue of 
substantive law. This means that the UK will have to consider the scope of any state 
aid provision. It may decide to either copy the EU state aid provisions, leaving out the 
cross border element, or create a new state aid model tailored to the UK. The latter 
would be complicated compared to copying the current EU model.    
Unless a state aid framework is created within the UK at the time of exit, there 
will be a range of pressing internal organisational issues and external coordination 
issues. It will create enormous legal uncertainty for existing state aid recipients as well 
as for businesses/sectors being involved in ongoing state aid cases. In case a trade 
agreement is not subscribed, the relationship between the UK and the EU would be 
subject to the World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations and the corresponding 
state aid rules, which are more limited.77 Therefore, whatever route Brexit takes, it will 
be necessary to have a state aid framework. Other areas may be subject to WTO rules, 
such as public procurement. The UK participates in the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (WTO framework) as an EU Member State and its direct membership 
would also be at stake with Brexit. Many potential solutions have been proposed,78  but 
this topic will not be further explored in this article, as we will focus on state aid.         
Currently, the CMA does not deal with state aid or have any powers to enforce 
state aid. BEIS is responsible for state aid across the whole of government, including 
local and regional government and the devolved administrations in the UK. At the EU 
level, the Commission is the authority enforcing the EU state aid rules set out in the 
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 European Council (Art. 50) guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under Article 50 
TEU (29 March 2017) available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/> [Accessed 23 February 2018]. 
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 Ibid [20]. 
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  Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Consequences of Brexit in the Area of Public Procurement 
(IP/A/IMCO/2016-23, April 2017), p.27. 
STUMBLING 72:$5'67+(8.¶61(: ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENT: 
A STUDY OF COMPETITION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT AFTER BREXIT 
 
 16 
Treaty.79 Following Brexit, it has been decided that the CMA will be  the competent 
public authority to enforce state aid rules in the UK as opposed to the court. While there 
are a number of issues in carrying over the state aid rules to UK law in terms of 
substantive law and procedure, the internal organisational issues this present are likely 
to be very significant.80 The particular challenge is in the form of the CMA having, 
most likely, to enforce an area of competition law±state aid±which is new to the agency. 
For this, the CMA would need to establish a new state aid unit within the CMA. The 
likely reasons why the CMA will be the best placed authority to deal with state aid are 
multiple. First, the CMA currently has wide jurisdiction across the UK in relation to 
(amongst other things) competition law enforcement. Second, it has the necessary 
combination of legal, economic, and policy expertise. Third, it has the experience of 
analysing the effect of competition law on government policies and of conducting 
complex investigations involving detailed factual inquiry and economic assessments. 
Fourth, it already has experience of giving advice to public bodies on the competition 
implications of their policies or on proposals for legislation. Finally, its independence 
is widely recognised.81  
Although the CMA is independent of the Government, state aid will be a 
politically difficult area to enforce due to the potential tensions between Government 
and the CMA. The CMA would be required take action against the very Government 
funding its operation. One of the core elements of any state aid provision is that the aid 
is granted to a company or an industry through state resources. Thus, the perpetrator 
will always be the State and any action will almost always be against the State. Action 
can also be taken against a company, as seen in the recent taxation cases,82 but it will 
be the State¶V responsibility to recover any illegally provided aid.83 The European 
enforcer of state aid, the Commission, does not face the same political conundrum as 
the CMA, as it is enforcing the state aid rules against a large number of Member States. 
The political sensitivities surrounding state aid is unique to this area of law and is rarely 
presented in merger and antitrust cases. For the CMA, this presents a challenge of how 
it coordinates its own role vis-à-vis state aid within the wider UK government. 
Creating a new state aid unit within the CMA will carry resource implications 
and it is unimaginable that it could be funded on the current budget, adding to the 
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 $UWLFOH7)(8ZKLFKSURYLGHVWKDWµDQ\DLGJUDQWHGE\D0HPEHU6WDWHRUWKURXJK6WDWHUHVRXUFHV
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internal organisation challenges imposed on the CMA. There would be an unavoidable 
need to recruit and train specialists in the area of state aid. Unlike the merger regime, 
discussed above, there is no way to make state aid cost neutral. As mentioned above, 
in the area of mergers, the CMA could, although likely an unpopular move, increase 
the merger filing fee. In the area of anticompetitive behaviour, the CMA could impose 
fines. This is not an option in the context of state aid. At best, the CMA can decide to 
have a recovery mechanism, which attempts to restore the situation before the granting 
of aid, which is different to imposing a fine for anticompetitive behaviour.84 It is 
unknown how many state aid cases this unit would deal with on an annual basis, but it 
would naturally be more than now, where there is no state aid enforcement in the UK.  
Overall, the issue of state aid presents the CMA with a multi-headed reform 
challenge that can be understood in terms of the analytical framework we set out. It 
presents a major issue of substantive law, as there is no extant state aid law in the UK 
and legal provisions would need to be accommodated in some form. There are 
questions of external coordinatioQERWKLQWHUPVRIWKH&0$¶Vongoing relationship 
with the EU and its relationship with other parts of the UK government. Perhaps the 
most significant tension, though, is how the CMA will internally organise itself. The 
CMA has, at present, no state aid responsibilities as those lie with BEIS and the 
assumption of such a role would have wide-ranging implications. Once again, it is clear 
that each of these areas exert pressures on others. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Brexit will be a far-reaching catalyst for social, political, and economic change in the 
UK. At the time of writing this article, much of the detail of what Brexit will involve 
remains unknown. Within that fluid context, this article has, through a case study of 
two major aspects of competition administration, offered a piece of futurology in 
relation to the reformation of the administrative branch post-Brexit. In doing so, it has 
sought to shed light on a neglected part of the debate around the challenges facing the 
UK state both during and after the Brexit process. It has been shown that, whatever 
UHVXOWVIURPWKH8.¶VQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKH(8%UH[LWZLOOQHFHVVLWDWHDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
reform, which is likely to be wide-ranging and fast-paced. We suggested that the 
challenge facing administrative bodies in the UK²including the CMA²can be 
understood as possessing three key dimensions: internal organisation issues; external 
coordination issues; and substantive legal issues. In many places, these three 
dimensions will be in tension which each other. That is to say, the reality of redesigning 
administration post-Brexit will often involve a trade-off between questions of internal 
organisation, external coordination, and substantive law. The result of this trade off will 
be an inevitably imperfect new administrative settlement for the UK. From the 
perspective of administration across the EU, the analysis this article has offered²and 
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grappling with the implications of Brexit more generally²reflects the view that there 
has been the evolution RIDµFRPSRVLWHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ZLWKLQWKH(87KHLQWHJUDWHG
nature of EU administration is the primary source of the administrative challenge facing 
the UK. Of course, composite administration will remain in place for the remaining EU 
member states but, with Brexit, its nature is more likely to be revealed in a way it has 
not previously been seen. What the implications of withdrawing from it look like will 
also become much clearer. 
